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ABSTRACT. One of the main unresolved problems in policy making is the step from scale issues to
effective governance. What is appropriate for a lower level, such as a region or location, might be considered
undesirable at a global scale. Linking scaling to governance is an important issue for the improvement of
current environmental management and policies. Whereas social–ecological science tends to focus on
adaptive behavior and aspects of spatial ecological data, new institutional economics focuses more on
levels in institutional scales and temporal dimensions. Consequently, both disciplines perceive different
scaling challenges while aiming at a similar improvement of effective governance. We propose that future
research needs to focus on four themes: (1) How to combine spatial properties such as extent and grain
with the economic units of market and agent; (2) How to combine the different governance instruments
proposed by both perspectives; (3) How to communicate the different scaling perspectives (hierarchy vs.
no hierarchy) and meanings to policy makers and other stakeholders; and (4) How to deal with the non-
equilibrium conditions in the real world and the disciplinary perspectives. Here, we hypothesize that a
combined system perspective of both disciplines will improve our understanding of the missing link between
scaling and governance.
Key Words: combined system perspective; governance; new institutional economics; scaling; social–
ecological sciences;
INTRODUCTION
Society has recently experienced a number of severe
shocks, such as the excessive rise in food and oil
prices, which have led to massive hunger—
especially in developing countries—and the crises
in financial institutions that have put many people
in industrialized countries out of jobs and even out
of their houses. With the prospect of global climate
change already leading in the short term to more
disruptive climatic events affecting both industrial
and developing countries, it is urgent that we study
systems, their dynamics, and their governance
options (Ostrom et al. 2007, Berkes et al. 2009).
With the change from a hunting and gathering
society to an agricultural society, the impact of
human actions and decisions has increased from the
local to larger areas and ecosystems (Goudsblom
and Vries 2002, Cumming et al. 2006). System
approaches describe the world as a highly dynamic
and connected complex system. In recent decades,
researchers have recognized the need to incorporate
humans into the concept of complex systems,
leading to the notion of coupled human–
environmental systems. Central to this concept is
the human factor as the main driving and modifying
force of current land-system dynamics (Geoghegan
et al. 1998). The “land system” refers to the global-
scale, coupled, socioenvironmental system. It
includes land use, land cover, and ecosystems and
is a very scale-sensitive system, implying that
empirical research is heavily influenced by the
spatial and temporal scales investigated (Global
Land Project (GLP) 2005).
Policies have many unforeseen impacts on (agro)
ecosystems at different levels of spatial and
temporal scales. For example, it has been argued
that the EU decision to stimulate biofuel production
to decrease global climate change leads to
competition for resources to raise fuel crops vs. food
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crops, contributing to an increase in global food
prices that affects local poor urban populations in
developing countries (Boddiger 2007), and
stimulates farmers to overexploit natural resources
to make a living. Apart from these direct links
between policy and (agro)ecosystems at different
spatial scales, often unforeseen temporal consequences
in (agro)ecosystems exist that originate in the
multiscale interactions within these (agro)
ecosystems (Veldkamp et al. 2001, Dalgaard et al.
2003). This observation fits well within a long
history of disappointments in policy and
management related to our environment (Cash et al.
2006) and indicates that scale-sensitive policies and
governance structures are required.
One of the main unresolved problems with policy
making is the step from scale issues to governance.
What is appropriate for a lower level, such as a
region or a location, may be considered undesirable
at a global scale and vice versa. Scale can be defined
in many ways (Costanza et al. 1993, Costanza et al.
1999, Gibson et al. 2000, Wu and Li 2006), but all
definitions refer to quantitative dimensions of a
phenomenon defined in space and time. Quite a
significant body of literature exists on technical
scaling issues (Wu and Li 2006). They are mainly
centered around disciplinary research on geography
and landscape ecology. Economists, however, often
speak about aggregation level instead of scale level
(van der Veen and Otter 2003). Related to scale is
the notion of levels, which are seen as units of
analysis that are located at different positions on a
scale continuum. It is thus essential to differentiate
between “scale” and “level,” following a plea for
recognition of scale dependency (Peterson and
Parker 1998). Scale dependency leads to changing
observed empirical relationships when data are
aggregated and analyzed (Turner and O’Neill 1995,
De Koning et al. 1998, Kok and Veldkamp 2001),
leading to the concept of nested hierarchies in
ecology. One of the best known spatial-scale effects
of decision making is often referred to as the
NIMBY (not in my back yard) behavior of agents
at different spatial levels.
This led Cash et al. (2006) to visualize scales and
levels as different beads on a chain. Scale is also
intimately linked to observation methodology.
Different observation techniques of a phenomenon
may yield different (not always compatible) system
descriptions (Lambin et al. 2001). Apart from
observation, postulation can also have a significant
scale effect. A related issue is the disciplinary bias
often involved in measuring, assuming, and
describing systems.
Governance is a contested concept and is defined in
various ways. Discussions can for instance be found
in political sciences (e.g., Pierre 2000, Rhodes
2007), social-system sciences (e.g., Anderies et al.
2004, Janssen and Anderies 2007), institutional
economics (e.g., Williamson 1998, Bowles 2004,
Dixit 2004), and ecological economics (e.g.,
Constanza et al. 1999). This paper contributes to the
literature by systematically connecting social-
system sciences and economic governance as
developed within the field of New Institutional
Economics (NIE), an economic approach in which
other disciplines may play an important role in
understanding institutions and their effects on the
economy (Joskow 2008, Williamson 1998). Within
this tradition, we want to bridge social-system
sciences and NIE. Furthermore, institutional
economists are aware of the systems orientation of
NIE when analyzing institutions (Williamson
1996). More specifically, new institutional
economists study the social institutions that bind the
economic system (Coase 1978). Examples are
firms, markets for goods and services, land markets,
capital markets, international trade, and so on. In
line with Coase (1978), NIE can be defined by its
subject matter, which is the economic system. In
this sense, Coase is critical to modern economic
analysis (Medema 1995). We believe that our
approach contributes to the analysis of economic
systems.
A discussion of alternative economic approaches,
such as connecting to new economic geography or
new social economics, is beyond the scope of this
paper. We chose to focus on NIE because it provides
ways to analyze governance and coordination of
social arrangements. Also, given its systems
orientation and interdisciplinary approach, elucidating
the connections with NIE seems to be a logical next
step. Introducing alternative economic theories
would change the focus of the paper at the expense
of bridging NIE and social-system sciences.
Effects of scaling on governance have become
recognized as an important issue nowadays. Due to
the increased global connectivity between levels of
spatial scales and cross-scale interactions, new
governance structures or modes of governance are
warranted to meet the needs of the changing world.
In an exploratory paper on scale and cross-scale
dynamics, Cash et al. (2006) identified three major
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scale challenges referred to as (1) ignorance, (2)
mismatch, and (3) plurality. Ignorance refers to the
unknown cross-level and cross-scale interactions
that take place. Mismatch is the archetypal scale
problem in that human institutions do not usually
map coherently with the biophysical scale of the
resource in space and time. Plurality refers to the
often incorrect assumption that there is a single,
correct or best scale or level. The analysis of Cash
et al. (2006) was based on a specific set of examples
that did not cover all disciplinary perspectives.
In this paper, we explore the scaling governance
challenge by comparing landscape ecological and
economic perspectives on scale and level.
Landscape ecological and economic sciences have
different system delineations, quantification
principles, processes, and goal orientations. The
objective of this paper is to develop a research
agenda that can help to effectively bridge the gap
between multi-scale landscape ecological system
approaches and institutional economics scales via
governance. Before we construct the blueprint of
such a bridge, we will first build its piers by
characterizing the archetypical forms of both
paradigms. The main bridge structure will be
sketched by analyzing recent developments of both
sciences and their common and diverging aspects
with regard to governance. Insights from integrating
both perspectives will be discussed using a case
study on soil protection in the European Union (EU).
FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS: LEVELS IN
LANDSCAPE ECOLOGY AND
ECONOMICS
The most obvious way to start an analysis of the two
different system perspectives and scaling is to study
the system properties as used by landscape
ecological and economic sciences. To synthesize
the main features, we first characterize both
paradigms by their archetypes. This necessarily
involves discrepancies between the basic
representation of the core of both sciences and their
state of the art. We demonstrate differences in views
and backgrounds before we bridge both approaches
through governance. Both sciences have developed
over time from their archetypes and have
incorporated aspects of governance in their
framework. These developments in ecology and
economics tend to bring both paradigms closer
together.
In environmental sciences, governance is
considered to be a response of a socioeconomic
system aimed at managing unwanted effects of
human actions while taking care of human needs.
In this context, governance is seen as an adaptive
approach (Folke et al. 2005). The interactions
between societies and natural systems create
dynamic feedback loops in which humans
influence, and are influenced by, natural systems.
These dynamic feedback loops generate emergent
behavior that cannot be understood through a
separate analysis of man and nature (Holling 2001,
Kinzig et al. 2006, Walker et al. 2006). The
resilience alliance network (http://www.resalliance.
org/1.php) has developed its own systems approach:
the so-called social–ecological system (SES). A
structure composed of a common-pool resource, its
users, and an associated governance system is an
example of a SES (see Janssen and Anderies
(2007)). Almost in parallel, there have been
initiatives that focused more on land-use systems,
which referred to such systems as coupled human–
environment systems (HES) (Turner et al. 2007).
Both approaches strongly advocate a complex
systems approach whereby humans are seen as an
element of an hierarchical multi-scale system. In
HES and SES, people and ecosystem seem to be
seen as part of one system with mutual feedback and
feed forwards.
Economic governance can be defined as the
processes that support economic activity and
economic transactions by protecting property
rights, enforcing contracts, and taking collective
actions to provide appropriate physical and
organizational infrastructures (Dixit 2003). In NIE,
a governance structure (institutional arrangement)
is an arrangement between economic units that
governs the ways in which units can cooperate or
compete. This implies that in the NIE context
governance structures govern transactions over the
short or long term in a formal or informal way. These
structures may involve a single individual, a group
of individuals cooperating, or the government
(alone or in cooperation with others) (Davis and
North 1971). The institutional environment mainly
defines (or acts as a constraint on) the environment
of the institutional arrangements (Williamson
1996).
Social–ecological systems are coupled systems of
people and nature (Brand and Jax 2007). Much of
the current research is devoted to understanding the
coupled system behavior (Westley et al. 2002).
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Most of the work on SES has been done on the
amount of disturbance a system can absorb and still
remain within the same state or domain of attraction
(Folke 2006). A parallel development happened in
the Land-Use Cover Change (LUCC) project of the
International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme
(IGBP; http://www.igbp.net/) under the International
Human Dimensions Programme on Global
Environmental Change (IHDP; http://www.ihdp.unu.
edu/) (Lambin and Geist 2006), which focused on
land-use systems. The LUCC community (now
GLP) uses a subdivision in socioeconomic and
biophysical system components that interacts at
different levels. A consequence of such a system
view is that effects are considered to cascade up and
down in the system, leading to sometimes
unforeseen land dynamics (Veldkamp 2009).
There is no “scale theory” in economics—in fact,
scale is hardly treated in economic textbooks
(Jaeger and Tol 2003, van der Veen and Otter 2003).
New institutional economics has provided more
realistic approaches than Walrasian economics and
models how to deal with imperfect markets and the
role of institutions in managing our environment.
The central proposition of institutional economics
is that institutions matter (see, for instance,
Furubotn and Richter 1997, North 2000,
Williamson 2000, Ménard 1995). Institutions are
the written and unwritten rules, norms, and
constraints that humans devise to reduce uncertainty
and control their environment (Ménard and Shirley
2005). Also, Williamson (2000) explicitly includes
time in his approach on levels of social analysis.
The different levels—(1) embeddedness (informal
institutions, customs, traditions, norms, and
religion), (2) institutional environment (formal
rules of the game, i.e., constitutions, laws, and
property rights), (3) governance (play of the game,
e.g., aligning governance structures with transactions),
and (4) resource allocation and employment—
change at different speeds. Embeddedness changes
rather slowly compared with resource allocation and
employment. Higher levels determine what is
feasible at lower levels. In other words, governance
structures must align with characteristics of
transactional activities, institutional environment
must align with governance structures, and social
norms and beliefs must conform to existing
institutions. Misalignment will cause tensions and
unnecessary costs within the system. These levels
are linked, meaning that levels are dependent upon
each other, and feedbacks between the lower and
higher levels are relevant. The institutional
approach of Williamson does not explicitly include
biophysical factors as do the environmental
sciences. However, NIE can be applied to the
environment (see, for instance, Polman (2002) or
Paavola and Adger (2005)).
SYSTEM PROPERTIES OF ECOLOGICAL
SCIENCES AND ECONOMIC SCIENCES
We start by systematically discussing the system
properties as modeled or postulated by both
sciences. These properties include: boundaries, the
smallest entity, the level of complexity, processes,
and goal orientation within the system. Finally, we
discuss the role of agents. Figure 1 gives an
overview of the discussed system properties and
presents how both archetypes of the ecological
(landscape ecology) and economic (Walrasian
economics) sciences have developed more
integrating concepts of governance in their
framework. Landscape ecology has transformed
into socioecology, whereas NIE has developed from
Walrasian economics.
System boundaries
Landscape ecology commonly defines the system
and its boundaries in geographical terms. The
system is delineated by a clear boundary referred to
as the extent of the system. Within this delineation
of systems, other subsystems can be identified that
are expected to be hierarchically nested within the
overall system. Examples are a river basin
subdivided into sub-basins, which are further
subdivided into local catchments. The choice of
extent has a large effect on the results of analysis
and the system complexity derived (Turner and
O’Neill 1995).
Social–ecological systems are determined by the
combined extent of spatial entity and actors
(including institutions). Instead of an ecosystem,
units are typically man made, e.g., countries,
regions, parks, and farms. Gridded data is typically
used in such a system to facilitate the merging of
socioeconomic and geo-ecological data. The
emphasis is usually on pattern description, analysis,
and modeling (Carpenter et al. 2001, Lambin et al.
2001). In land-use systems, the role of extent is even
more important (Kok and Veldkamp 2001), which
is why we can observe national boundaries in
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Fig. 1. Comparison of the different system properties between ecological sciences and economic
sciences.
remotely sensed data (Woodcock and Strahler
1987).
In a Walrasian economic framework, complete and
enforceable claims are exchanged on competitive
but well-connected markets. This implies that
individuals’ actions are based on far-sighted
evaluations of their consequences, which, in turn,
are based on preferences that are self-regarding and
exogenously determined. In this context, social
interactions are only contractual exchanges. In the
Walrasian world, the concept of increasing returns
to scale can be ignored, implying that the choice of
extent has no relevance for the analysis or their
outcomes. In economics, the system is defined in
terms of actions (often reflected at markets that are
equivalent in extent) and individual decision-
making units (equivalent to grain). In Walrasian
economic theory, spatial extent and spatial
resolution seem to coincide (van der Veen and Otter
2003). Economists have paid more attention to the
scale of time than the scale of space. New
institutional economics adds non-competitive and
non-contractual relations to the economics system.
Coase (2005) argued that concentration on the price
system resulted in neglect of other parts of the
economic system. The costs of exchange, for
instance, also depend on the institutions of a country
(Coase 1998): its legal system, its political system,
its social system, its educational system, its culture,
and so on.
Smallest entity
The smallest spatiotemporal unit used in the
ecological system description is either the species
(assembly) or the smallest measured unit, such as a
site or satellite image pixel. These smallest units are
referred to as grains. Thus, from an ecological point
of view, the system is described in terms of its extent
and grain. Again, the choice of grain size has large
implications for the processes that landscape
ecologists can analyze and from which they can
derive relevant ecological indicators. Grain
sensitivity is especially high in systems where
multiple processes interact and where the causality
is unknown (Rastetter et al. 1992).
In a SES, the smallest entity is a combination of
actor and grain. Very often this is a combination of
the smallest spatial management unit (field, farm,
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or reserve) with its actor (farmer, manager). The
actor is directly linked to spatial units, and his (or
her) decisions connect the units managed. As a
result, there are direct connectivities between agent
and the grains used in the study.
Within Walrasian economics, the smallest entity is
the decision-making agent and the products he
produces or consumes. The concept of scale in
economics is evident in the distinction between
micro- and macroeconomics. Whereas microeconomics
deals with individual consumers, producers, etc.,
and is concerned with the allocation of resources
among these economic agents (Russell and
Wilkinson 1979), macroeconomics is concerned
with the way actions of consumers, producers, and
public agencies determine economy-wide movements
in output, unemployment, and inflation (Blanchard
and Fischer 1989). Economic analyses are not that
sensitive for the smallest entity. In economics, at
the level of the agent, behavior can be projected on
the basis of exogenous variables such as prices. At
the aggregated level, prices are endogenous, and
failure to specify them that way leads to significant
errors in the projections of all other variables
(Costanza et al. 1993, Norton 1995, van der Veen
and Otter 2003). Various procedures have been
suggested to address the aggregation problem
encountered if micro and macro data are integrated
(van Daal and Merkies 1984). Such an aggregation
procedure is far from trivial in complex, non-linear,
discontinuous systems (van der Veen and Otter
2003). The smallest entity in NIE remains the agent,
without an extension to spatial units. However, a
fundamental idea animating NIE is that transaction
costs exist and necessarily influence the structure
of institutions and the specific economic choices
people make. The transaction costs, boundedly
rational individuals, and the existence of
opportunistic behavior are among the main features
that distinguish it from the standard Walrasian point
of view. Bounded rationality means that it will be
costly for individuals to contemplate every
contingency that might arise over the course of a
transaction (Kreps 1990). Opportunistic behavior
means that individuals are self-interested, with guile
(Williamson 1985).
System quantification
Ecological systems are usually sampled by studying
a certain number of sites or observations that are
considered as representative for the studied system.
The system is usually quantified with explorative
multivariate statistical techniques because ecological
systems theory expects many different, often
unknown, interactions of species and processes
within the system (Pickett et al. 1989, Rastetter et
al. 1992).
The advocated integration of socioeconomic and
biophysical system data for SES quantification is
complicated by the fact that it is very difficult to
merge information from different source scales and
levels. Very pragmatic approaches for spatial and
temporal analysis have used artificial spatial units
(grids) and arbitrary temporal units (growing
season, months, years) to integrate data from
different disciplinary sources (Veldkamp et al.
2001). One key scale property often ignored in such
data-integration attempts is scale hierarchy (Wu and
Li 2006), which is often clear in biophysical
systems, especially ecosystems and other earth
systems. Such a hierarchy is not valid for social
systems because humans are part of a network. They
not only have a direct role as consumer, member of
a family, or part of a community, but also vote for
a political party or support a NGO that might have
a different, contradicting, role in the socioeconomic
system. A critical issue that has emerged from all
these scaling attempts in SES is that there is often
a fundamental mismatch between the human and
ecological system units.
In Walrasian economics, the system is postulated in
a relatively simple way, allowing straightforward
comparisons of different economic situations using
“Pareto efficiencies” (Russell and Wilkinson 1979).
An allocation in the economy is Pareto efficient if
there is no alternative allocation that leaves
everyone at least as well off and makes some people
clearly better off. Institutions and preferences are
considered as exogenous to the economic system.
In NIE, preferences and institutions have become
endogenous. No longer is the market the sole
institution that is able to coordinate the market
economy. Other coordination mechanisms such as
authority become more central. Geography and
ecological sciences quantify the system by diverse
measurable processes and patterns. Economics
quantifies the scarcity of goods and resources using
the price. This may be straightforward for system
products traded as commodities but is less
straightforward with other ecosystem services
available as common goods, such as biodiversity
(Daily et al. 1997, Heywood 1995, Ostrom, 1990).
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System complexity
Landscape ecological systems are considered to be
very complex, with many interacting different
species across space and time, causing scale-
sensitive relationships (Pickett et al. 1989).
Examples of relationships causing such complexity
are: prey–predator interaction, symbiosis; interaction
between resources such as nutrients and water gives
specific patterns of vegetation and population
dynamics of species. An important aspect of these
interactions is that they operate at multiple scale
levels, sometimes demonstrating surprising
connectivities between systems in space and time
(Kolasa 1989, Rastetter et al. 1992, Holling 2001).
Examples are Saharan dust feeding the oceans and
even the Amazonian rainforest and the impact of
low concentrations of pesticides on amphibian
development. The key concept of structural
complexity in ecology is the existence of
hierarchically nested levels within the system. Allen
and Starr (1982) first conceptualized the Hierarchy
Theory for ecology, which was later elaborated on
by O’Neill (O’Neill et al. 1986, O’Neill 1988). An
example of a nested hierarchy is the sequence: cell–
tissue–leaf–branch–tree–stand–forest–ecoregion.
Land systems have a functional and structural
complexity. Many different drivers and factors
influence the system (functional complexity) and
interact at many different levels (structural
complexity), yielding often unforeseen outcomes
and responses (Folke 2006). Land governance and
policy are often seen as a human response to
undesired effects and outcomes. In this context,
governance and institutions are seen as adaptive
behavior at different levels and are also referred to
as multi-level governance (Marks 1993, Pierre
2000). In order to link humans to land it is relevant
to have detailed information about land tenure. In
this respect, the classical research by Ostrom about
governing the commons (Ostrom 1990) illustrates
what can happen if land tenure is not clear or
existent. In landscape ecology and socioecology,
system complexity is high.
The core assumptions of Walrasian economics are
rational choices such as maximization, stable
preferences, and equilibrium states (Vatn 2005).
Rationality in Walrasian economics demands that
preferences be complete, transitive, and continuous.
Furthermore, in order to be termed rational, choices
must be in accordance with the highest preference
of the agent (Vatn 2005). As a logical consequence
of this stereotypical behavior, preferences are
treated as stable or as given. In such a system, there
is no limit on the parties’ ability to foresee
contingencies, to write contracts, and to enforce
them (Tirole 1999: 754). Thus, the system can be
complex, with known agents that are able to handle
the complete system. New institutional economics
moves to more complex governance, requiring the
introduction of added security features such as
reducing incentive intensity and incurring added
bureaucratic costs (Williamson 2000). This means
that the move to complexity is done by more
complex contract design including, for instance, the
length of the contract, penalties for breach, and
provisions for information disclosure. New
institutional economics maintains an evolutionary
perspective, which is a consequence of human
nature and of the complexity of social systems
composed of numerous agents whose behavior
cannot be fully anticipated (Brousseau and Glachant
2008). In NIE, there is a need to develop ways to
deal with complexity.
System processes
In landscape ecology, the focus is on processes of
species interaction and species–environment
interaction. Species distribution and patterns are
linked to hypothesized processes, which are often
not directly measured. As a result, the system is
never in equilibrium but constantly striving toward
such a state. The ecologists use the marble in the
cup model to illustrate how a system state (marble)
constantly changes as it moves within a stability
landscape (cup). Due to the system complexity,
multiple alternative steady states are possible with
sometimes abrupt and irreversible state transitions.
Consequently, a whole new branch of ecology has
devoted its research to understanding system
dynamics and complexity focused on issues of
resilience and robustness (Holling 2001, Folke
2006, Fletcher and Hilbert 2007).
Within socioecology, many potential interacting
system processes exist. The emphasis is usually on
processes that interact between the social and
ecological systems, e.g., a land-use system. Often,
the emphasis is on how matter fluxes and flows,
such as nutrients, energy, carbon, (Vitousek et al.
1997, Priess et al. 2001), or decision making (Parker
et al. 2003, Verburg et al. 2006) can cause other
types of connectivities.
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The hierarchical scale issue in ecology is an inherent
challenge that cannot be solved easily in a
socioeconomic context. It could well be the most
important challenge when the aim is to develop
policies and governance to mitigate scale effects,
because social networks cannot be scaled.
In the Walrasian system, the assumed forward-
looking individuals can instantaneously update their
knowledge of the entire system. The invisible hand
of Adam Smith will automatically lead to the
optimal solutions. In the absence of market failures,
private land-use decisions are expected to be
socially efficient, i.e., to maximize the net social
return from use of the land.
From an institutional economic perspective, land-
use decisions involve market failure and generate
external costs (e.g., environmental pollution) or
benefits (e.g., landscape attractiveness for tourism)
that are not borne by the private parties making the
land-use decisions. In such cases, the private net
return from a given land use differs from the social
net return, and private land-allocation decisions will
not necessarily be socially efficient (Segerson et al.
2006: 79). The economic theory of externalities
holds that the divergence between private and social
costs and benefits is caused by a lack of appropriate
defined (or enforced) property rights and
jurisdiction. The basic solution is the internalization
of the external effects into the economy, e.g., by
correcting the market price for the external effect or
to establish quotas. The scale of the external effect
determines the level needed to organize this
internalization. Although the concept of externality
is widely used, various definitions still exist, and
some of them may be imprecise, as observed by
Mas-Collel et al. (1995).
Agent behavior
A system hierarchy implies a certain nested
structure of process interactions. Within ecology,
the system and species behavior is therefore
considered to be, to some degree, predictable. That
is why ecological models accept certain margins of
uncertainty, and stochastic elements are often
assumed. But the system as a whole is considered
to have predictable behavior and patterns
(Jørgensen 1994). So landscape ecology has limited
information about the actors and processes and their
interactions but considers the system within certain
margins predictable.
Agents in a SES context consist not only of humans
but include all types of species (plants, animals, etc).
Within the broad definition, the social–ecological
approach assumes self-organizing behavior. One
important aspect of behavior is the adaptive
component: all agents respond to each other and to
their perceived changing environment (Folke et al.
2005). However, this adaptive component is still
poorly addressed even in agent-based models
(Parker et al. 2003) for land-use changes.
Within Walrasian economics, the focus is on agents
and their behavior on markets, without a specific
spatial dimension or interactions (van der Veen and
Otter 2001, 2003). Consequently, Walrasian
economics does not aim to predict real-world
systems. Instead, the Walrasian approach represents
economic behavior as the solution to a constrained
optimization problem faced by a fully informed
individual in a virtually institution-free environment
(Bowles 2004). It deals with choices as it analyses
the problem of allocating scarce resources to
alternative uses. Many economic models are
concerned with how this choice is made by the
interaction of decision-making units—consumers,
producers, and public agents—in a very constrained
economic system (Russell and Wilkinson 1979). By
using fundamental basic assumptions (e.g.,
disregarding transaction costs, assuming complete
information and complete markets), Walrasian
economic models bring complexity down to a
manageable level (Vatn 2005). The agent
description in NIE has become more behavioral and
more institutional. This is because behavioral
disciplines have contributed considerably to
understanding human behavior (Gintis 2007)
beyond profit-seeking rationality.
BRIDGING SOCIAL–ECOLOGICAL
SCIENCE AND NEW INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS
Thus, we can observe two different approaches: on
the one hand, ecology embracing complexity and
making it a main focal point of research and, on the
other hand, economics simplifying the system by
making many assumptions and constraints in order
to keep the system complexity manageable. Both
streams—socioecology and NIE—now use agent-
based modeling (ABM) to understand the role of
agent decision making proceeding from these
different starting points. The problem with agents
is that they are not always directly linked to spatial
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units. It is still problematic to link ABM to spatial
land patterns, although considerable progress has
been made (Parker et al. 2003, Verburg and
Veldkamp 2005, Filatova et al. 2009a, b).
When we compare the two paradigms of social–
ecological science and NIE, we can conclude that
both have adapted to the need to be able to deal with
real-world complexity. Both approaches recognize
the need for a complex (system) approach, bridging
the gap between landscape ecology and economics.
Social–ecological science is founded in ecology
theories whereas the NIE approach is well founded
in economic theories. They both agree on the central
role of agents and their decision making. Their main
difference is in the (bounded) rational goal
orientation of economic theories vs. the non-rational
dynamics of socioecology of survival of the species.
Socioecology is better linked to spatial scales and
scale dynamics (issues like resilience and
robustness) whereas the NIE has a better grip on the
decision and transaction processes involved.
Governance is an inherent part of NIE, but it is still
an underdeveloped system response and process in
socioecology. In the following section, we elaborate
on governance as a way to bridge social–ecological
science and NIE perspectives.
The discussed social–ecological science and NIE
perspectives have quite an impact on the way
coupled SES are described and considered to be
managed. Economic science is goal oriented,
aiming to influence human (actor) behavior;
ecological science, however, is less goal oriented,
aiming to manage “natural” biophysical processes
and locations. These fundamentally different
viewpoints have implications for solving scaling
and linked governance issues, as will be illustrated
in the case study on soil protection in the next
section. When we compare the six evaluated system
properties of Fig. 1, we can derive different system
perspectives on governance.
Social–ecological system boundaries rarely match
the governance units in The Netherlands; an
exception is watershed management. Economic
units seem to match governance units, with
macroeconomics matching national government
units and microeconomics matching household
units. However, at other levels, this match does not
occur, e.g., at the municipal level, and consumers
and producers do not fit into the hierarchy of
government. The smallest entity in a SES are agents
in an environment, whereas economics primarily
focuses on transactions, agents, and organizations
with a poor spatial connection. Finally, agent
behavior is also assumed to be different. In the
social–ecological context, the agent is adaptive and
tends to be self organized whereas, in NIE, the agent
is assumed to be both self- and other-regarding.
In systems complexity, social–ecological science
builds on nested hierarchy with self-organization
whereas NIE goes from low complexity based in
linear systems per scale level toward social
networks that can have components of different
levels. Social–ecological science tends to take the
measured and modeled system dynamics as given
and considers governance as a means to mitigate or
“fix” unwanted effects of system change. New
institutional economics, however, starts by
organizing institutions and improving the
description and organization of the institutional
aspects. One could describe this as social–
ecological science seeing governance as a
dominantly exogenous process whereas, in a NIE
context, governance is an endogenous process in
which governance structures depend on the
underlying properties of the economic system. The
combination of governance structures that will be
most efficient in addressing a given coordination
problem depends on the underlying technology and
social facts that give rise to interdependence among
actors. Institutions that govern a particular
interaction will affect the preferences and beliefs of
participants (Bowles 2004).
Another essential discriminating aspect is the
different goal orientation of both approaches. The
NIE goal is usually aiming for more effective
economic optimal solutions by including more
aspects of ecological systems. This is achieved by
internalizing more factors that are considered
relevant in order to facilitate better functioning
governance structures, including markets. Social–
ecological science considers the SES as a complex
dynamic system with many known and unknown
functions and processes. Governance is only
required when stakeholders or scientists identify
unwanted environmental effects. This more
response-oriented approach in a complex system
context is referred to as adaptive governance (Folke
et al. 2005, Lebel et al. 2006, Ostrom 2008).
Consequently, approaches are advocated that allow
the analysis of trade-offs and alternatives by using
scenario and modeling approaches. The role of
stakeholders is specifically important in defining
alternative desirable futures and outcomes (van
Vliet et al. 2009).
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COMPARING SES AND NIE FOR A CASE
STUDY ON SOIL PROTECTION
Erosion and its consequences are interesting from
both a social–ecological and socioeconomic point
of view. As we will show, scaling issues are
important for designing policies to deal with
negative impacts of erosion. Soil protection (e.g.,
through control measures to reduce the risk of
erosion) is an important goal of the EU soil strategy
(European Commission 2006, Kuhlman et al. 2010).
In Fig. 2, we attempt to apply the framework
developed in the previous chapters to the EU soil
strategy. Comparable to Cash et al. (2006), columns
define “scales” such as the spatial, temporal, and
analytical dimensions used to measure and study
soil erosion. The rows are “levels” (string of beads)
and defined as the units of analysis that are located
at different positions on a scale. The first and second
columns are, respectively, organized along a spatial
scale and a jurisdictional scale. Figure 2 is limited
to public governance; distinguishing a spatial scale
and jurisdictional scale for analyzing governance is
important. The analysis can be extended to private
governance, e.g., chain management or consumer
organizations. This extension would go beyond the
purpose of the example—comparing social–
ecological and NIE perspectives on soil protection.
National boundaries are of geopolitical and cultural
nature and often have no environmental meaning.
If one investigates natural amenities, it makes more
sense to define regions from an environmental
perspective, i.e., using environmental (hydrological,
ecological) boundaries. Land use has environmental
consequences that differ markedly depending on the
pattern of remaining habitat and the size and
proximity of disturbances to ecologically sensitive
areas. (Geoghegan et al. 1997: 251). Alternatively
to the spatial and jurisdictional scales, other scales
could be used as a starting point for analysis;
however, this goes beyond the scope of this paper.
The third column represents elements of existing
governance. Finally, the social–ecological and NIE
columns on the righthand side of the figure represent
the different issues and processes that are studied
by these approaches.
The social–ecological science column shows that
the erosion process is identically present at many
scales (both erosion and sedimentation occur at the
field level as well as at the higher level). The
magnitude of the phenomenon changes along the
scale axis. It is well documented that plot-level
erosion rates can be an order of magnitude higher
than those for whole catchments (Schaller et al.
2002). Possible ecological or economic instruments
to combat erosion also change with scale. At the
field level for individual farmers, the construction
and maintenance of terraces or the conversion of
arable land into pasture are suitable measures to
reduce serious erosion. At the watershed level, more
generic agricultural measures  are  more suitable,
e.g., contour ploughing and the requirement to plant
cover crops to prevent (moderate) erosion. In order
to successfully combat erosion and prevent
sedimentation of a lake in a region, a combination
of measures at different levels is necessary:
measures that are meant for farmers at the field level,
measures for agriculture at the regional level, as well
as measures for building sites and reforestation in
all the non-field areas. Some of these measures go
beyond the level of individual farmers and require
some form of organization. In economics, agent or
household behavior is related to the incentives
received. Here, the distinction between on-site and
off-site benefits is important. If the on-site benefits
exceed the costs of a measure, the farmers will
implement the measure voluntarily. However, if the
combined on-site and off-site benefits exceed the
costs, but the on-site benefits alone do not (Kuhlman
et al. 2010), governance (economic) instruments are
warranted to obtain the optimal situation for a
region. Institutions are, therefore, important. The
type of agent differs along the jurisdictional scale.
At the municipal level, it concerns local
organizations operating in social networks of
stakeholders; at higher levels, organizations such as
NGOs and governments (and interorganizational
networks) become more important.
Governance solutions for the erosion problem will
be different depending on the jurisdictional level.
The higher the level in the jurisdiction column, the
more formal is the governance structure.
Governance and jurisdictions can either correspond
or show mismatches in solving erosion problems.
Governance structures influence (formally or
informally) agents at every jurisdictional level. For
instance, governance at the EU level affects pressure
groups at the member state level as well as the
decisions of farmers at the farm household level.
However, the aggregate farmers’ individual
decisions affect the erosion at higher levels,
including the European level.
The three scale challenges identified by Cash et al.
(2006) are also eminent in the erosion problem.
Ignorance is the fact that, although the problem is
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Fig. 2. Scaling and governance issues in the European Union soil strategy.
felt at all scales, the solution using soil-conserving
measures is predominantly at the field, farm, and
community scales. Mismatch is related to the fact
that the jurisdictional levels do not coincide with
the erosion processes. Erosion leading to
sedimentation in a particular river concerns the
practices in the entire river basin, which may span
the territory of more than one country. The reverse
also applies, supra-national regional policies affect
not only the targeted river basins but also regions
outside them. Kuhlman et al. (2010) conclude that
soil-preserving measures at the field level targeting
farmers (stimulated by subsidies from a higher
jurisdictional level) reduce sedimentation at higher
spatial levels. This is an example of cross-scale
dynamics. Plurality is present because there is not
one single best scale or level to solve the erosion
problem; erosion can be best mitigated by a
combined multi-scale approach (Veldkamp et al.
2001). Connecting different scales is important for
solving erosion problems (and enhancing
sustainable agricultural production), not only in
Europe but also in other areas of the world.
Addressing these challenges can potentially
contribute to savings in transactions costs (related
to governance) that can be analyzed by scrutinizing
the costs and benefits of governance at different
levels. An important issue is the link between
policies at different levels (country vs. provincial)
and soil protection at, for instance, the field level.
This issue relates to the debate on central vs. non-
central government. Benefits can be assessed in
terms of the adequacy of the rule with preferences
and needs of agents. Costs are linked to the resources
earmarked by agents for solving coordination
problems at a given “level” of governance (see
Brousseau and Raynaud 2007). Thus, it can be
concluded that there is not one uniform, generally
applicable, governance solution to combat erosion
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at multiple scales and levels. A practical
consequence for policy making is that flexibility in
the use of different governance structures and
measures at different scale levels is required to
address these challenges. Taking into account
complexity, discontinuity, and non-linearity of
systems in a more systematic way can help to
develop effective policies. The consequence is that
combining SES and governance structures
suggested by social–ecological science and NIE can
lead to soil protection at different levels in which
public and private governance is combined.
TOWARD A NEW RESEARCH AGENDA
Linking scaling to governance is an important issue
for the improvement of current environmental
management and policies. The notion of different
scales (e.g., temporal and spatial) and levels across
these scales is central. We started from the
disciplinary paradigms of landscape ecological
sciences and Walrasian economics. Both disciplines
are more-or-less aware of the scaling issues
involved and developed over time into the science
fields of social–ecological science and NIE.
We propose that a combined socioecology–NIE
scientific approach can lead to more integrated
solutions for the scaling governance problem. By
combining the two approaches, which have already
been converging over the last decade, we hope to
bridge the gap between multi-scale system and
multi-level governance research. Future research
will need to focus on how to link the different system
properties used by both disciplines. After a
consultation process, we identified the following
research themes:
 
1.  How to combine spatial properties such as
extent and grain with the economic units of
market and agent. We suggest that a thorough
social–ecological type of analysis of NIE
systems and vice versa might enlighten us as
to how to combine them effectively. The use
of gridded data in order to merge
socioeconomic and geoecological data could
be a means to describe NIE systems and their
spatial extent. The way governance is studied
in NIE can contribute to an integral analysis
of a SES in which governance of the system
is composed of different governance
structures, where the arguments developed in
NIE will help define the extent of the system.
 
2. How to combine the different governance
instruments proposed by both perspectives.
Here, a more concise description and
definition of typical social–ecological
governance might be the way forward.
Social–ecological science could contribute to
NIE for the analysis of complex economic
systems. Functional and structural complexity
as studied in social–ecological science can
help NIE make the arguments for institutional
complexity more clear.
 
3. How to communicate the different scaling
perspectives (hierarchy vs. no hierarchy) and
meanings to policy makers and other
stakeholders. Here, issues such as visualizing
complex system dynamics and multi-scale
trade-offs might be a fruitful way ahead. The
inclusion of external effects in social–
ecological science could be beneficial. First
experiments with problem and scenario
visualization indicate that visualizing the
spatial and temporal dimensions of problems
and solutions changes the policy makers’
perspective (Beers et al. 2010)
 
4. How to deal with the non-equilibrium
conditions in the real world and the social–
ecological and NIE perspectives. Here,
further elaboration of temporal dynamics in
both NIE and social–ecological approaches
might give us more insights (see Apeldoorn
et al. (2010), this issue). The understanding
of non-equilibrium conditions will help us
understand systems that will be relevant to
both disciplines. System changes occur when
thresholds are passed, and factors contributing
to this are often combinations of social–
ecological and economic nature. A research
question could be whether governance is a
way to prevent or encourage system changes,
or whether governance is but one of the
contributing factors.
 
 It is important to realize that the dynamics
governing a system provide an account of its out-
of-equilibrium behavior and, thus, not only help in
the process of equilibrium selection but also in
studying the response to shocks and other problems
for which the standard comparative static method is
ill suited (Bowles 2004). Finally, from a governance
perspective, it is relevant to note that our analysis
has clearly demonstrated that scale matters and that
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recognizing different scales and levels is a necessity
in environmental policy and governance. It is
actually the role of framing, sense making, and
meaning of knowledge in policy making that can
help implement solutions effectively for the
challenges regarding ignorance of cross-level and
cross-scale interactions. The mismatch of human
institutions with the biophysical scale of resources
in space and time might not be the problem, but
rather the notion that there is no single, correct or
best solution. Science will not provide answers but
only options and trade-offs to choose from (Giller
et al. 2008). Currently, different disciplines inform
policy makers quite differently, with a tendency for
the economic approaches to provide answers and
the ecological sciences to provide problems.
Fortunately, we are already observing a
convergence of both disciplines toward a more
balanced analysis and more realistic presentations
of governance options.
CONCLUSIONS
Significant progress can be made in effective
governance by linking ecological and economic
system perspectives. Whereas social–ecological
science tends to focus on adaptive behavior and
aspects of spatial ecological data, NIE focuses more
on levels in institutional scales and temporal
dimensions. Consequently, both disciplines
perceive different scaling challenges while aiming
at a similar improvement in effective governance.
We propose that future research needs to focus on
four themes: (1) How to combine spatial properties
such as extent and grain with the economic units of
market and agent; (2) How to combine the different
governance instruments proposed by both
perspectives; (3) How to communicate the different
scaling perspectives (hierarchy vs. no hierarchy)
and meanings to policy makers and other
stakeholders; and (4) How to deal with the non-
equilibrium conditions in the real world and the
disciplinary perspectives.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss1/art1/responses/
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